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ABSTRACT 
The object of this paper is to highlight the contribution that a 
dual economy in the South as organizational asimmetry makes to the 
oil price rise process and its effects on welfare, first, when the 
North is Neoclassical, secondly, when the North behaves a la Taylor. 
The model shows that when the oil price rises, despite the 
improvement of the Southern terms of trade vis-a-vis the North, we1fare 
in the South may deteriorate due to a decline in the 1evels of output 
and employment in the modern-advanced sector. When the North is 
Neoclassical, employmcnt in the modern sector unambiguously falls. 
In the "structura1ist" perspective, when the North is Neokeynesian, 
the South's 1evel of employrnent in the modern sector wi11 fall 
whenever OPEC's marginal propensity to import is sufficiently low. 
Whereas in the first framework, the oi1 intensiveness of Southerhoutput 
is critica1 to the results, in the second the critica1 parameter is 
OPEC's recyc1ing coefficient. 
In general, the analysis increases our understanding of why region 
respond different1y to the same externa1 shock and how from different 
organizational asimmetries we should derive alternative policy 
implications. With the current fa1l in oil prices, the topic promises 
to be relevant for sorne time, although the direction of the shocks has 
·been reversed. 
1 • 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the North-South context, one of the "structura1" featurer 
rnost often used to characterize a Southern econorny is the dual 
economy concept [Findlay (1980), Taylor (1981), Mclntosh (1984), 
Burgstaller (1985)J. This assumption was put forward by Lewis 
(1954) and implies the explicit acknowledgement of a type of 
dualism which is descriptive of thc domestic economic structures 
within rnany developing countries -for instance, Taiwan [Mclntosh 
(1978)J. It concerns the labour supply in the South, specifically, 
it emphasizes that the South's economy faces surplus labour 
because of the existance of a subsistence sector which continuous-
ly supplies workers to the modern-advanced sector at a para-
rnetrically given Lewis-wage whose floor is set by the alternative 
earnings in the hinterland. 
In contrast,the North has be en traditionally modelled as a 
Neoclassical economy [Findlay (1980), Chichilnisky (1981), 
Burgstaller (1985)J. However, Keynesian unemployrnent is ruled out 
by definition in these models. Yet a high and rising unemployment 
trend has be en a feature of OECD economies since the first oil 
price shock in 1973-74. Whi1e providing a usefu1 benchmark, it 
shou1d be clear that a Neoc1assica1 mode1 wou1d not be the 
appropriate vehic1e to investigate the impact of an oi1 price 
increase on effective demand, emp10yment and we1fare in a world 
of Keynesian rigidities. 
The realization that Keynesian rigidities are a important 
aspect ofmacropolicy in the world economy has spurred a number 
of authors to put forward rnodels in the "structuralist" perspective. 
These derive from Taylor's work and very representative papers in 
the are a are Taylor (1981), Kanbur and Vines (1986) and Gónzalez-
Romero and Kanbur (1986). 
Furthermore, the consideration of a Keynesian view of the 
world economy will permit us to explore the critical role of OPEC's 
recycling coefficient being les s than one. Alternative1y, in a full 
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competitive market world economy, OPEC's recycling coefficient 
will necessarily egual one since otherwise Walras' Law would not 
prevail. 
In this paper, we examine the alternative effects on the 
Lewisian economy of the South of a rise in the world price of oil 
(which is set monopolistically by OPEC). Firstly, at the time 
when the North's economy is at full-employment and, secondly, at 
the time when the North exhibits Keynesian rigidities and 
unemployrnent. Thus, we will be able to understand the contribution 
that the Lewis' assumption as organizational asyrnmetry of the 
South makes to the character of the model. Bringing this together 
with a particular asyrnmetry taking place in the North, we will 
also be able to pinpoint the contribution of each to the results 
of the analysis. With the current fall in oil prices, the topic 
promises to be relevant for sorne time, although the direction of 
the shocks has been reversed. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we set out 
the structure and properties of the model when the North is 
neoclassical and explore the comparative static properties of 
the model when the oil price changes. In section 3, we do the 
same in the case that the North is Keynesian. Section 4 concludes 
the papero 
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2. A Neoc1assica1-Lewisian Mode1 
We assume a three regions, North-South-OPEC, view of the world. 
A11 three regions are each specia1ized in their production activities. 
The North produces manufactures, the South a prirnmary product and 
OPEC specia1izes in oi1. These three regions are 1inked through 
trade channe1s. The North and the South employ an intermediate 
imported input, oi1, from OPEC, whereas manufactures 
and prirnmary products are consumed by the three regions. 
A distinguishing featúrc between the North and the South is 
taken to be the e1asticity of 1abour supply. Usually, labour supply 
seems to be inelastic in the North whereas it seems fairly elastic 
in the South, see for instance McIntosh (1978). A simplifying 
assumption is incorporated here. We assume that the North exhibits 
a perfectly inelastic labour supp1y, that is labour supply is fixed 
in the North. Alternatively, the South is assumed to be a dual 
economy of the Lewisian (1954) type, therefore, the modern-advanced 
sector of the Southern economy faces a perfectly elastic labour 
supply from the subsistence sector at a parametrically given product 
wage rateo Letus specify the behavioural relationships of the modelo 
The North presents a linear,technology using two inputs, labour 
and oil. The introduction of capital would not alter the essence 
of the analysis , see for instance Taylor (1981,1983) and donzálÉ~­
nomero and l<anbur (1906). profit-ma::imizing behaviour of the 
Northern firms under perfect competition and constant returns to 
scale generate the following supply price equation. 
(1) 
where PI' PR and wI denote the price of the Northern cornmodi ty, 
the price of oil and the wage'rate in the North, respectively. aRI 
and II designate the oil- and labour-output coefficients. 
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As we mentioned above, labour supply in the North is fixed, so 
that 
( 2) 
We also assume a regime of labour factor inmobility across 
regions. In consequence, the equilibrium condition for the labour 
market in the North will be 
(3 ) 
where 01 designates the level of output in the North. 
Let us now examine the behaviour of the Southern economy. We 
assume that the Southern technology in the modern-advanced sector 
is also linear employing two inputs, labour and oil. Perfect 
competition pricing on the part of Southern entrepreuners generates 
~hÉ zero marginal profit condition ~or maximization, that is, 
(4) 
where PA and wA denotes the price of the Southern output and 
the wage rate in the South, respectively. aRA and lA denote now 
the oil- and labour-output coefficients, also respectively. 
However, as we noted earlier, the modern-advanced sector in the 
South faces a perfectly elastic labour supply at a parametrically 
given wage rate in terms of its output (see, Findlay (1980) and 
Taylor (1981,1983)), 
(5 ) 
Employrnent in the modern sector of the South will therefore 
be given by: 
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We now draw attention to the demand side of the two regions. 
We assume that the pattern of preferences of Northern (Southern) 
agents leads to a proportional expenditure system, where a 
fraction aI(aA) of expenditure goes on prirnmary products whereas 
the rest 1 - al (1 - aA) goes on manufactures ¡ similarly, OPEC' s 
oil revenue is assumed to be entirely devoted to the consumption 
of primmary products and manufactures in proportions aR and 
1 - aR ' respectively. We also assume that oil extraction costs are 
negligible¡ the introduction of such costs would be a routine 
exercise that wou1d not i11uminate the ana1ysis futher. 
Free trade is assumed, hence the "law of one price" will hold. 
In consequence, the world markets equilibrium conditions for 
manufactures, primmary products and oil are: 
Q = 1 
(p - a p) 
1 RI R Q (1 _ a ) + 
PI 1 1 
where QR designates OPEC's oil supplies which, according to 
(9), adjusts instantaneously to any given leve1 of world demand 
for oi1. 
(7 ) 
(8) 
(9) 
'To summarize, the parameters of the model are the technical 
coefficients. 11 ' lA ,aRI and aRA' the preference parameters. 
aA ,aR and al ' the North's 1abour supp1y LI ' and the fixed 
Southern product wage rate AA' Furthermore, the price of oil, 
PR ' is assumed parametrica11y given in order to explore the 
comparative s~atic properties of themoael across equilibria. 
The model can be seen as a general equilibrium system given 
by eight equations (l)-(B) in eight unknowns. Walras' Law is 
satisfied, so that the system should be solved out when we 
consider one good as a numeraire. Thus, the model collapses in 
a system of seven linearly independent equations in seven 
endogenous variables and a numeraire p¡ • The endogenous 
variables are PA.' w¡ , wA ' 01 ' 0A ' 0R and LA' 
Before exploring the comparative sta tic properties of the 
model, we examine the crucial properties of the equilibrium: 
existance, uniqueness and stability. Thus, the strength of the 
results will lie on that we, with the help of the model, are 
able to investigate the basic interrelationships between supply 
and demand factors in the oil price rise process. 
First, let us find out the solutions of the modelo From 
equation (1), we obtain the solution for w¡ 1, noticing that 
money wages in the North are an increasing function of labour 
productivi~óK From equations (4) and (5), we obtain PA and 
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wA in equilibrium¡ noticing thus, the higher the fixed product 
wage rate in the South, the higher the Southern cornmodity prices. 
Also clearly, higher labour productivity in the South will improve 
the North-South terms of trade PA and the wages in the South. 
From the labour market equilibrium conditions in the North, 
equation (3), we obtain the volurne of Northern cornmodities in 
equilibrium. Finally, from equations (7) and (9) and substituting 
for 01 and PA from the equilibrium values obtained above, we 
have then the equilibrium solution for 0A' 
L¡ [al + aR¡ PR(aR - al)] (1- AA lA) 
°A = l¡ • aRA PR [(1 - aR) - (aA - CXR) AA lA] 
(lO) 
Notice that the South's output depends positively upon the North's 
preferences for prirnmary products and negatively upon the OPEC's 
p.reiere.nce.szcr J>l,o.r.tbarn .cOIlll1locllt.ie.s •. MoJ:eover ,_ it can be .ea.sily 
shown that the higher the labour productivity in the South, the 
higher the level of output supply¡ if the patterns of preferences 
across regions are identical this relationship also holds. 
Gi ven 0A' from (6) ~IÉ nml obtain LA 
Notice that higher levels of output supply 
in equilibrium. 
in the North will 
have positive effects on the South's levels of output and 
employment in equilibrium. Finally, given 0A and 0I ' from 
(9) we compute the oil supply from OPEC. 
Thus, we have found the equilibrium solutions of the model 
for a given set of parameters. Specifically, the equilibrium 
7. 
of the model is uniquely determined for a given price of oil. 
Since the model also exhibits Walrasian stabilit~ see Appendix 1, 
we can now study the comparative static properties of the model 
when the price of oil changes. 
First of all, from equations (4), (5) and (1), it is inmediate 
that 
dlog PA dlog ~IA 1 
dPR 
= dPR = PR 
(11 ) 
and 
dlog wI aRI 
dPR = 1 - aRI PR 
(12 ) 
Thus, in this specific model an oil price rise, and therefore higher 
marginal costs, will improve the Southern terms of trade since 
the product wage rate in, the'South is fixed, thu$.decreasing 
the wage rate in the North. Notice also that, as expected, PA 
and wA will change in the same 
;change will also be the same in 
product wage rate in the South. 
direction and their percentage 
oder to keep invariant the 
Moreover, from equations (3), (10) and (6), we obta'in the 
responses of the output supplies in the North and the South and, 
therefore, that of Southern employrnent, when \~É move to a new 
equilibrium with a higher price of oil 
dl09 0A 
dPR = [al + aRI 
(14) 
, " ._,' . 
8. 
and 1 . A (15 ) 
Hence, the North's output is comp1ete1y unaffected when the oil 
price rises since 1abour supp1y in the North is fixed and the 
1abour market is always in equi1ibrium. On the contrary, the 
Southern output supp1y response is a1ways negative. The argument 
is the foUowing: wit a fixed product wage in the South, the 
increase in the oi1 price rises the Southern'terms of trades 
vis-a-vis the North; the rise in PA creates, since the system 
is Wa1ras stab1e, an excess supp1y of prirnmary products and 
consequent1y the output supp1y must fa11 in order to balance 
the supp1y and the wor1d demand for Southern cornmodities. Labour 
demand of Southernfirmswi11 corresponding1y fa11, thus 1eading 
to a decrease in the 1eve1 of emp10yment in the South's advanced 
sector. 
lt is convenient to continue our discussion by examining the 
oi1 price rise effects on each region's economic we1fare. Economic 
welfare wi11 be measured here through changes in the leve1 of real 
consumption in the North and South [see Kanbur and Vines (1986) 
and Gonzá1ez-Romero (1986)J. Thus, the real consumption in each 
region wi11 depend upon both the 1eve1 of nominal consumption 
and the ideal cost of living index for each's region consumption 
a, 1-a, 
basket, PA ~ PI ~ Let us denote real consumptions in the North 
and South as WI and WA , thus 
(1- a RI PR)QI 
= JJ~J::J=''JJ::'" 
p al 
A 
(PA - aRA PR) QA = JJ''''JJJJJ!K!''J'JJK=K:J~ 
aA PA 
and the changes in real consumption 1eve1s when the oi1 price 
rises wi11 then be 
= -
(16 ) 
(17) 
(18) 
9. 
(19 ) 
Therefore, when the oil price rises and hence the Southern terms 
of trade improve, the North's real consumption will unambiguously 
fall, though the North's output is invariant and the labour market 
in the North clears at the existing real wage rateo Alternatively, 
the South's real consumption may or may not fallo Here, two 
crucial impacts on the South's welfare take place: firstly, the 
workers in the modern sector may or may not experience a reduction 
in their. real wage -the first two terms of the RHS of (19)-. But 
the South will always experience an unambiguous decline in output 
-the third term of the RHS of (19)-; in consequence, a fraction 
of Southern workers will be laid off and bound to return to their 
family's farm where they will enjoy the "alternative earnings" of 
the subsistence sector, which normally fa11s far below the income 
in the advanced sector. Obviously, the higher the fall in the 
South's modern sector levels of output and employment, the more 
detrimental to the South a rise in the price of oil will be. 
This model is relatively similar to that of Taylor (1981) 
since here we also assume surplus labour in the South at a fixed 
Lewis wage; but critical differences are that, firstly, the 
South's output does employ oil as an input, so that aRA > O , 
and secondly, Southern output is not supply side constrained. 
Consequently, our results differ from those of Taylor; thus, as 
the oil price rises the Southern terms of trade improve rather 
than deteriorate due to the fact that oil is an input in Southern 
productio~ and a constant Lewis wage must be maintainedi therefore, 
the relative price responses of each region's demand will lead to 
an excess supply in the world market for corn; in consequence, 
Southern output supply will fall so as to equilibrate the market. 
The results also differ from those of Adams and Marquez (1983) 
since these two authors also obtained a deterioration of the 
Southern terms of trade rather than an improvement. Sumarizing, 
tbe conclusion is that the impact on the South's welfare is 
ambiguous rather than detrimental as in Taylor (1981) and Adams 
and Marquez (1983); if \'le also assume, as these authors do, that 
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OPEC recycles only into purchases of Northern products, uR = O , 
then the negative impact on Southern welfare vlill be even stronger, 
since Southern output 
equation (14) and set 
and emp10ymcnt will fall even further, see 
uR = O • 
3. A kÉokÉónÉsi~nJuÉwidian Mode1 
Here, the North presents sorne typica1 Keynesian features. It 
is a "fix-price" economy with excess capacity. The price of the 
Northern commodity is determined by a stab1e markup over the 
variable cost: 
(15) 
-where TI designates the markup rate, wI represents the rigid 
nominal "Iage in the North. We can think of a situation where the 
North's economy er.periences an excess supply of labour; since 
the money wage is invariant, the economy gets stuck with a real 
"Iage that is too high and with a leve1 of emp10yment be10w the 
quantity of labour supp1ied for the workers. In consequence the leve1 
of employment in the North wi1l be derived from the demand for 
labour of the firms, that is 
Turning to the demand side, we assume that a fixed fraction 
c I of Northern income is -consumed and that consumption 
expenditure is a1located, as before, in proportions a I and 
(1 - a I l between Southern and Northern commodi ties, respecti vely1. 
Moreover, Northern demand also presents an autonomous component 
G (N) • 
With respect to the South and OPEC, we assume that these 
economies behave similarly as in Section 2, though novl each 
regiorrs effective demand may be lower than demand for full 
employment, thus cA' c R < 1 , being (1 - cA' and (1 - cR' the 
fixed fractions of income saved in the South and in OPEc2. Market 
equilibrium conditions for the two commodities and oil require 
the excess demand in each market be zero; therefore 
11. 
EDI = - PIQI + c I (1-aI ) (PI-aRIPR)QI + G(N)PI + 
+cA(l-aA) (PA-aRAPR)QA + c R(l-aR)PR QR = O 
EDA = - PA QA + c I al (PI - a RI PR) QI + cA a A (PA - aRA PR) QA + 
+ C R a R PR R = O 
In sum, the parameters of the model are the same as in the 
Neoclassical-Lewisian model of section 2, though three more 
parameters are now included: the autonomous demand in the North 
dEk)~hÉ marginal propensities to consume c i ' and the fixed 
money wage in the North wI • The price of oil PR is also 
assumed parametrically given in order to solve the modelo 
The model is thus a system of eight independent equations 
in eight unknowns. The equations are (4)-(6) and (15)-(19) and 
(17) 
(18 ) 
(19) 
the endogenous variables are PI' PA ' wA ' QI ' QA ' LA ' LI 
and QR' Substituting (4),(6),(16) and (19) into (17) and (18), 
~lÉ get 
PA PR 
c (1 - a ) - + aRA - (cR (1 - a R) A A PI PI 
QI = JJJJJJ~JJJ~JJJJJJJJJJJl>1 
-c (l-a )) A A 
PA PA (1 - ca) - + aRA A A PI PI 
QI = JJJJJJ~JJJl>~2~JJJJJJJJJ QA 
Q + G(N) 
A l>1 
where the symbols l>1 and l>2 are defined as follows: 
PR l>l = 1-CI (l-aI ) + a RI PI (cI (l-aI ) -cR(l-aR)) 
PR 
PI (cR a R - c I al) 
Equations (20) and (21) can be sol ved simultaneously for QI 
(20) 
(21) 
and FA/PI • Notice that the second term in equation (6) denotes 
the Keynesian multiplierin operation for a given level of 
Southern output. Equation (21) shows the positive dependence of 
the Southern output upon Northern demando 
1, 
12. 
The two linear equations in QI and QA are diagramatically 
represented in Figure 1. Equation (21) presents a greater slope 
than equation (20), since 111 > 112 > O : moreover the numerator in 
(21) is greater than the ~umÉrator of the first term in (20)3. 
Given these slopes and since equation (20) presents a positive 
intercept with the vertical axis, then the equilibrium exists 
and is unique: 
Q 
Q* A 
El)I=O [equation (21)j 
Notice th~t Figure 1 also illustrates the stability of the model 
the stability of the model is formally analyzed in Appendix 2. 
We can now solve the two fundamental equations of the model, 
(20) and (21), to find the expressions of the values of QI and 
0A at equilibrium. We obtain 
13. 
(23) 
Given PI in equi1ibrium from equation (15) and substituting 
it into equations (22) and (23), we can solve simu1taneously for 
0I and 0A also in equilibrium, and then the values of the 
remaining variables in equilibrium are easily found. 
Since the equilibrium of the model exhibits the three fundamental 
properties we looked for, we can now draw our attention to the 
comparative static properties of the rnodel when the economy shifts 
to a world equilibrium with a higher price of oil. Firot, from 
equations (4),(5) and (15) we obtain the impact on the North-South 
terrns of trade 
aRA (1+ 11) wI II 
PIPA(l-AAIA) 
Therefore, the rise in the price of oil has a positive irnpact on 
the South's terms of trade vis-a-vis the North. Initially, the oil 
price increase will bring about a rise in cornmodity prices, PA 
and PI i in the North, the rnoney wage is fixed, therefore the 
rise in PI will sirnply depend upon the technical coefficient 
a RI and the rnarkup rate 11. In the South, the rise in PA will 
depend upon the technical coefficient aRA: however the rise in 
ilA . wilJ. .. .1J:¡ J:.ur II .iJ:lc.rea.se ti e .sou th '.$ JIlOJle Y ~I_g e . lo' A .in .=de.r 
to keep a fixed product \·¡age rate in the South, PA ~¡fll therefore 
be pushed further up thus dominating the evolution of the North-
South terms of trade. 
14 . 
• 
Thus, initially we1fare in the South seems to be positively 
affected whereas welfare in the North is negatively affected. 
However, the analysis of the total impact on welfare a1so reguires 
us to consider the oil price rise impact on output supp1ies and 
emp10yment levels in the North and South. 
In order to investigate the latter impact, we first examine 
the simplest case where patterns of consumption demand across 
regions are identical, that is cA = c R = c I = c and a A = a R = al = a 
In this case, the tirIO fundamental eguations of the model become, 
P 
c(1- a) ~ 
PI G(N) 
01 = 1 - e (1 - a) 0A + 1 - c (1 - a) (20b) 
PA (1- ca) -
PI 
ca (21b) 
since d (PA/PI) /dPR > ° a1ways, the slopes of the two eguations 
will rise¡ however, the slope of eguation (21b) will increase by 
more than the slope of eguation (20b), since 1- c(l- a) > ca 
and (1 - ca) > e (1 - a) always. In this simple case, the oil price 
shock and the subseguent deterioration of the North-South terms 
of trade lead, through substitution effects, to higher world 
demand for Northern cornmodities and also to lower world demand 
for corno The lower world demand for corn will depress Southern 
output supply and this will have a negative impact on the world 
demand for Northern goods. The final impact will therefore be an 
unambiguous fall in Southern output and employment and an 
indeterminate response ir. Northern output and employment. 
A diagr~mmatic representation of these two cases is given in 
Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2, shows the case when the South's 
output reduction is sufficiently large so as to promote a fall 
in the North's output. The world economy moves from an 
initial equilibrium EO to a new eguilibrium E' . The second 
case is depicted in Figure 3. Here, the fall in Southern output 
supply is not too large¡ so that, the positive impact on Northern 
demand, due to the lower terms of trade wi th the South, dominates 
Figure 
Figure 
2 
Q. 
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12 0 1 
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15. 
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and hence Northern output increases slightly. The world economy 
moves from an initial equi1ibrium EO to a new equilibrium E2 
The eonclusion then, is that the model under the assumption of 
identica1 patterns of consumption demand across regions shows that 
an oil price rise will a1ways have a positive effect on the South's 
terms of trade, a negative effect on the Southern output and an 
ambiguous effect on Northern output supply. Thus, an oil price 
rise will therefore be detrimental to the North whenever the 
North's output falls, in the sense of deteriorating equilibrium terms 
of trade and real eonsumption. Conversely, if the North's 
output rises, an oil price rise will have an ambiguous impact on 
the North's welfare, since though its terms of trade deteriorate, 
its levels of output and employment will improve. The impact on 
Southern welfare will always be ambiguous, since though its terms 
of trade improve, its levels of output and employment fall; notiee 
that a very large fall in output may dominate the impaet on real 
eonsumption and the impact may therefore be detrimental to the 
South. 
Finally notiee that from the two solutions for 01 and 0A' 
equations (22) and (23), if we set eA=cR=cl=e and aA=aR=al=a, 
we obtain: 
> O 
< 
and < O 
We now relax the assumption of identical patterns of consumption 
demand across regions. Thus, the marginal propensities to consume 
may now differ but pattern of preferenees are still assumed to be 
identieal, that is CA '1 eR '1 el and aA = aR = al = a • The two 
fundamental equations of the model now become 
Q .. I 
( 21c) 
17. 
Here, the oil price rise initially leads to an i~provÉmÉnt of 
the Southern terms of trade;hence, as we have just discussed, 
the South's output will fall and the North's output change will 
remain ambiguous. Furthermore, if OPEC's marginal propensity to 
consume primmary products is smaller than the South's, then the 
Southern transfer to OPEC due to a higher oil bill, will determine 
a negative impact on world demand for primmary products and hence, 
a further fall in Southern output which, in turn, will have 
neqative effectson the"world demand for manufactures and hence, on 
" " 
North's output. Also, if OPEC's propensity to ·consume is also smaller 
than the North's, then the North's transfer to OPEe due to a higher 
oil bill will induce a fall in demand for the two commodities. 
Thus, Southern output will fall even further and so will the world 
demand for manufactures and the North's output. We come to the 
conclusion that if OPEC's proportion of expenditure relative to 
its income is smaller than in the North and in the South, then 
the oil price rise will lead to a fall in world demand for the 
two commodities and to asevere reduction in output supplies 
and employrnent levels. 
Nevertheless, the North's ~conomó presents a mechanism to 
fight the recession, they are its deteriorated terms of trade 
vis-a-vis the South. It will depend upon the size of the 
deterioration in the North-South terms of trade and the value 
of OPEC's marginal propensity to consume that the final impact 
on the North's output and employrnent be either a rise or a fall. 
If it rises, the Southern output and employrnent fall will be 
shrinked because of higher Northern demand for Southern commodities, 
but not sufficiently. 
In sum, the final impact will be a reduction in Southern 
output supply and an ambiguous response of the North's output 
supply. Notice that the higher the budget deficits in the North 
the less negative the impact on the North's economy. The impacts 
'on each region's real consumption level will be identical to 
those maintained earlier when the patterns of consumption demand 
across regions were assumed to be exactly the s~ÉK 
Figures 4 und 5 depict the two possible alternative equilibria 
., 
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[( equa tion ( 20cl] 
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As we noted ear1ier, the oi1 price rise deteriorates the 
North-South terms of trade, thus 1eading to a positive impact 
on Northern output and to a negative impact on Souther output. 
However, if OPEC's marginal propensity to consume is sma11er 
than the South's, then the Southern transfer to OPEC due to 
a higher oi1 bi11, wi11 determine a negative impact on ~1Mr1d 
demand for the two cornrnodities and hence, a further fa11 in 
Southern output. The new fa11 in Southern output wi11 have 
negative effects on the wor1d demand for Northern goods and 
hence, on the North's output. A1so if that the wor1d economy 
may atta in in the case considered above. Notice that 
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d (PA/Pl) /dPR > O and dPl/dPR > O ahlays; then, since we are 
'thinking of a wor1d pattern of consumption such that c l ' cA < cR ' 
we conc1ude that the rise in the slope of equation (21c) wi11 
be greater than the rise in the slope of equation (20c). 
Furthermore, since c l < cR ' the intercept of equation (20c) 
wi11 shift downwards. Figure 4 represents the case when the 
South's output and the North's output decrease; in 
this case, the terms of trade effect is not powerfu1 enough so 
as to cause an increase in Northern demand capab1e of reversing 
the oi1 price rise negative effects on the North. The wor1d 
economy shifts from an initia1 equi1ibriurn EO to a new 
equi1ibriurn E3 • Figure 5 shows the opposite case when the 
change in the terms of trade and the size of the North's budget 
deficit prec1ude the recession in the North. The wor1d economy 
moves from an initia1 equi1ibriurn EO to a new equi1ibriurn E4 
Forma11y, from the two equations that solve for 01 and 
0A equi1ibriurn va1ues, equations (22) and (23), if we set 
aA = a R = al = a., 'we then have 
dOI 
- > O dPR < and 
dO* A 
dPR 
< O • 
We go on to focus on the most general case, so that now each 
'rÉ9ion~~ behaviouT involves 'spending ~~harÉ a i o~ its expenditure 
c i on Southern cornrnodities, and a share 1 - a i on Northern 
cornrnodi ties. Forma11y, cA 'f cR 'f c l and aA 'f (XR 'f (XI • We now turn 
our attention to equations (22) and (23); co11ecting terms, the 
two equations become: 
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Since d(PA/Prl/dPR > O and d(PR/Prl/dPR > O always, Then, 
we can draw the following proposition: whenever aA > a R > a r , 
if cRaR < crar' 1j!3 > O, 1j!4 < O so that cRaR < cAaA al so 
holds and 1j!S < O 
then 
dOr > O and 
dOA < O dPR < dPR 
these conditions can be rearranged in the following way and the 
proposition therefore becomes: 
then 
CltCl~) < c I CI-C1I ) - cAC1CClA-Cl1 ) + céA CClA-ClR) 
clt~ < cAaA - C1CACClA-Cl1 ) - CICoC~JClI) 
and 
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It is worth cornmenting bricfly on these conditions. Comparing 
them with those of the "structuralist" model of Gonzilez-Romero 
and Kanbur (1986), we note that a deterioration of the Southern 
terms pf trade vis-a-vis the North in the model of Gonzilez-
Romero and Kanbur (1986) takes place under indentical conditions 
that a decline in South's output in this modelo Therefore, in 
both models a sufficiently low OPEC's marginal propensity to 
consume Southern and Northern cornmodities has always negative 
effects on the South's welfare. On the contrary, here we cannot 
find a set of sufficient conditions to ensure a negative response 
of the North's output to an oil price shock. The reason why, lies 
in the terms of trade effect; since the Southern terms of trade 
improve when the oil price increases, then the North's Keynesian 
economy will experience an unambiguous positive impact on its 
demand side. World demand for Southern cornmodities will fall 
beca use of better terms of trade whereas the world demand for 
Northern cornmodities will rise; the world market for prirnmary products 
present an excess supply and, consequently, the world market for 
manufactures will show an exceso clemand aince Walrasian stabi1i ty holds 
(aee Appendix 2). Therefore, 'che South's output \~il1 tend to 
reduce whereas, on the contrary, the North's output will rise. 
This positive impact on the North always exists and will depend 
upon the importance of the North-South terms of trade deterioration 
that finally dominates the negative impacts on Northern demand 
due to excessively low OPEC marginal propensities to consume the 
two cornmodities. Consequently, an oil price shock will of course 
under certain conditions promote "recession" but always stimulates 
aggregate demando This fact illustrates how the North has an 
endogenous mechanism available to deal with deflationary shocks. 
We should note that if we set the OPEC's recycling coefficient 
equal to zero, i.e. cR = O , we obtain that the aboye conditions 
on OPEC's marginal propensities to import will always hold, so 
that Southern output will unambiguously fall whereas Northern 
output change would rema in ambiguous. If we assume that OPEC's 
recycling coefficient larger but still sufficiently small so as 
to fulfil the aboye conditions, then an oil price rise will lead 
to an unambiguous fall in Southern output whereas the effect on 
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Northern output will still be ambiguous since the North-South 
terms of trade deteriorate slightly, thus having positive 
relative price effects on world demand for Northern commodities. 
In the alternative polar case when we set cR=l , so that 
OPEC's recycling of its oil revenue is complete, then, if patterns 
of demand across regions differ, the conditions on page 20 to 
obtain an oil price rise impact on output and employment negative 
for the South and ambiguous for the North will still hold, but 
now depending only upon the configurationof OPEC's pattern of 
preferences¡ thus, for instance, if the configuration is such 
that aA > aR > al ' then the first inequality will not hold any 
more and therefore the results just mentioned may or may not 
take place. Alternatively, if patterns of preferences are assumed 
to be identical throughout the world, aA = aR = al = a , then all 
of the inequalities on page 20 will hold in the opposite sense, 
and therefore the oil price rise impact on output and employment 
will still hold ambiguous for the North but now it will be 
positive for the South. 
This model is more similar to Taylor (1981) than the 
Neoclassical-Lewisian model of section 2 since the North is also 
here modelled as a Neokeynesian economy. Furthermore, we also 
assume surplus labour in the South at a parametrically given 
Lewis wage¡ the critical differences with Taylor's model lies 
in the South, since here we include oil as an input and Southern 
output supply is not bounded. This model also differs from 
Adams and Marquez (1983) in assuming a Lewisian South. 
Consequently, our results are more general than those of the 
above cited authors. Thus, if we impose in our model that the 
South does not use oil in production, then the Southern terms 
of trade improvement will be averted and the above proportion 
established, concerning the direction in the changes of Northern 
and Southern output supplies, become: 
if 1/13 > O then 
dQ* 1 < O dPR 
dQ* A < O 
dPR 
then 
recycling behaviour are not obtained in Taylor and Adams and 
Marquez. 
We should note that the critical variable in this model to 
obtain the alternative results is OPEC's recycling coefficient 
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cR as in the Structuralist model of González-Romero and Kanbur 
(1986); thus, it is in contrast with the Neoclassical-Lewisian 
model of section 2, where OPEC's recycling coefficient was 
assumed to hold equa1 to one so that the critia1 variables where 
the oil output coefficients and the different degree of recycling 
into purchases of Northern and Southern products. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
There is no a we11-established presumption that the terms 
of trade for prirnrnary products may or may not deteriorate when 
the oil price increases. Moreover, the deterioration or 
improvement of the terms of trade is not a sufficient condition 
to deteriorate economic we1fare of these regions. In this paper, 
we try to explore this argument in the context of ·a world economy 
where the South is considered a dual economy of the Lewis (1954) 
type. Thus, we develop and examine the impact of an oil price 
rise in two alternative frameworks, one where the North behaves 
as a Neoclassical economy, the other when neokeynesian features 
are introduced into the model (critical1y in the North). The two 
three-region mode1s examined here, determine an improvement of 
the Southérn terms of trade via-a-vis the North since the 
Lewisian wage rate in the South must be kept fixed. However, it 
is a1so proved that it is not sufficient condition to affirm 
that the oi1 price rise wi11 a1ways b~nÉfit the South in the 
context of a specific measure of we1fare, the real consumption. 
The mode1 of section 2 shows that when the North is Neoclassical, 
the oi1 price rise will a1ways lead to a fa11 in the levels of 
output and employrnent of the South's advanced sector; therefore 
real consumption in the South rnay or rnay not decline. Moreover output 
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supply in the North will also shrink, thus deteriorating ns real 
consumption unambiguously. The model of section 3, where 
neokeynesian featuresare incorporated, reflects that if OPEC's 
marginal propensity to import commodities from the North and 
South is sufficiently low, then the South's levels of output 
and employment in the advanced sector will decline. Now, the 
North's levels of output and employrnent may or may not decline 
since it possesses an endogenous mechanism that creates aggregate 
demand and, in this way, diminishes the extent of the recession, 
they are its deteriorated terms of trade vis-A-vis the South. 
Thus, the impacts on real consumption in the North and South are 
ambiguous and depend upon the size of both output supplies 
(employrnent levels) and terms of trade responses. 
In general, the analysis increases our understanding of why 
regions respond differently to the same external shock and sho~ls 
how sensitive it is with respect to arbitrary assumptions rnade 
about the behaviour that the regional economies exhibit at the 
time that the oil shock takes place. With the current fall in 
oil .prices, the topic promises to be relevant for sorne time, 
although the directions of the shock s has been reversed. 
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NOTES 
1.- We do not distinguish between profit and wage income; 
introducing thus difference would not alter the essence of 
the analysis which follows, although it would complicate it 
considerably. 
'.- Notice that it we set cA = 1 and only allow 
reflecting the fact that OPEC's recycling may 
the forthcoming result also hold. 
cR '11 thus 
not be complete, 
3.- To show that Al > A2 > 'O , notice that Al - A2 = PI (.1 - c I ) -
- aRI PR(c I - cR) and it is always positive. To show that the 
numerator in (7) is greater than the numerator of the first 
term in (6), notice that the numerator in (7) minus the 
numerator of the first term in (6) is PA -(l-c)+ 
PI A 
and it is always positive. 
4.- At point E, for a given terms of trade, an increase in 
Northern output ",ill lead to a rise in Southern output supply 
and demand, which, in turn, will induce a further increase in 
the North's output but to diminishing extent than the initial 
rise. 
Appendix 1: Stability of the Neoclassical-Lewisian Model 
We assume a rather common approach to stability in trade 
theory literature: factor markets clear and the burden of 
adjustment is placed on the international commodities markets. 
Thus, factor prices remain at their equilibrium values and 
26. 
demands for and supplies of these rnay change because of changes 
in markets for traded goods. Moreover, the price of oil is fixed 
and the price of the manufactures in set egual to one, 
therefore the crucial emphasis of adjustment to equilibrium is 
finally placed on the price of the primmary product, the remaining 
traded good. Let us define excess demand in the world market for 
primary products as follows: 
Walrasian stability in this market requires ~IEmA) > O where 
Through substitution from the model, we obtain: 
íll~ (S) ílQA 
== ílPA + aA °A aPA 
al~Ek) 
O == apA 
an~Eo) aOA 
apA 
== aR aRAPR ap A 
Adding up thesc terms, we get 
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where <l0A/<lPA 
simp1y positive 
is infinite in the polar case, it can a1so be 
due to increasing opportunity costs in prirnmary 
products production re1ative to the production in the subsistence 
sector, see for instance Burgsta11er (1987). Therefore, 
$'(PA) > O a1ways and, in consequence, the world market for 
prirnmary products is Wa1ras stab1e. 
Appendix 2: Stability of the Neokeynesian-Lewisian Mode1 
Focusing a1so on the internationa1 dimension of the oi1 shock 
prob1em, we continue adopting the appea1ing simp1ification of 
ana1yzing the stabi1ity properties of the mode1 on1y through the 
markets for traded goods. The specific adjustment rules of 01 
and 0A in order to c1ear the markets wi11 be given by: 
" 
z 1 (O) = O , z l' > O 
" 
To ana1yze the stabi1ity of the mode1 we look at the Jacobian 
matriz of excess demand functions; if the determinant is positive 
and the trace negative, global stabi1ity ho1ds. The Jacobian 
matrix J is: 
PA c (1- a ) - + 
A A PI 
J= 
- (1 - ca) - + a -[ 
PA PR 
A A PI RA PI 
The trace of the matriz is obvious1y negative since 61 > O , 
(1- cA aA) > (cR a R - cA aA) and PA > aRA PR a1ways. The 
determinant of the matrix is positive; the proof is straight forward 
forward from that in note 3 • Consequent1y, stabi1ity ho1ds. 
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